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Introduction 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, Korea’s path to liberation from Japanese 
occupation was mired with persistent internal security threats and challenges from 
various political elements.1 Countering these internal threats was indispensable to state-
building initially for the American Military Government (AMG) and later the newly 
established Republic of Korea (ROK) government. The Korean Constabulary (KC) and 
the nascent ROK Army (ROKA) afterwards painstakingly conducted counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operations and had all but eliminated communist guerrillas from the southern 
zone of the Korean peninsula by 1956.2 Overall, it can largely be argued that the Korean 
COIN campaign conducted during this period had achieved all of its overarching goals. 
One notable aspect of the South Korean COIN experience is the marked 
improvement of the KC/ROKA performance level throughout the various operations. 
The missions conducted on Jeju Island eventuated in disastrous outcomes despite the 
wide gap in physical capabilities between the insurgents and government forces. On the 
island itself, 2,622 KC troops, 1,700 Korean National Police (KNP) officers, and 50,000 
civil defense personnel were barely able to suppress the isolated local guerrilla group of 
roughly 600 members who were armed with only 240 Japanese 99-type rifles. In 
contrast, the ROKA units were able to perform at a much higher tactical and operational 
standard in its later operations. While fighting conventional battles against the North 
Korean and Chinese forces at the front line, the ROKA effectively suppressed 
approximately 10,000 guerrillas in the southern zone, many of whom were well-
equipped and trained North Korean soldiers.  
This paper systematically analyzes the key factors that influenced the overall 
performance of the South Korea’s COIN operations from 1948 to 1953. More 
specifically, we trace the causes of combat effectiveness of the Korean security forces 
through the course of its various operations.3 We argue that improvements in two 
interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher level performance at the operational 
and tactical level: the unity of operational command structure and the subsequent 
improvements in tactical efficiency achieved through the guidance and oversight of the 
US advisory mission.4 First, the unification of the command structure minimized 
interference from the political leaders and paved the way for better cooperation and 
coordination amongst various government security forces. Furthermore, a much more 
simplified and a cohesive command climate also permitted the most competent junior-
level officers for the mission to be selected, and they would go on to make a marked 
difference on the field. Second, tactical effectiveness also underwent marked 
improvements during the course of the COIN campaign. Not only was this partly due to 
the implementation of a simplified command but also because of the continuous efforts 
put in by US advisors on the ground; continuous oversight of missions were recorded 
and joint intelligence efforts to weed out troops with dubious loyalties were conducted. 
Subsequently, operationally-proven officers were given the initiative to display 
adaptability to both the environment and the enemy that they faced.  
More broadly, our research contributes to the existing COIN literature in a 
number of interrelated ways. First, our work builds upon recent work on the issue of 
combat effectiveness in COIN operations, which remains an understudied theme within 
the literature.5 Second, we examine the causes of combat effectiveness of an indigenous 
force (or non-great power). The South Korean case remains one of the earliest and 
arguably one of the most successful cases of US efforts to develop an indigenous 
security force after World War II.6 As such, we focus on the COIN aspect of the 
advisory mission in particular to highlight the development of an independent Korean 
security force. Lastly, our study aims to contribute further to the growing literature on 
the role of indigenous security forces in COIN operations.7 
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly describes the hectic 
period surrounding the creation and development of the Korean security force in the 
aftermath of the World War II. In the process we outline some of the issues and 
challenges that the US forces and the nascent Korean government faced in forming a 
separate security force to combat internal threats. The next section examines four cases 
that occurred between 1948 and 1953: the Jeju Island Uprising, Yeosu-Soonchun (Yeo-
Soon) Rebellion/Mutiny, Chiri Mountain Operations, and Operation RATKILLER. The 
cases, presented chronologically, all address the issues of combat effectiveness at the 
operational and tactical level. That is, it is through within-case analysis based on 
primary sources (such as interviews/memoirs, committee reports and archival record) 
that we capture the changes brought about by a unified command structure and US 
advisory effort specifically for COIN operations.8 Lastly, we discuss our findings from 
the four cases before concluding with broader implications for future COIN research.  
Creation of the Korean constabulary: early development and obstacles  
As World War II dawned to a close, the US armed forces moved quickly into the 
southern zone of the Korean peninsula, both to organize the withdrawal of the 
surrendering Japanese forces and to act as a balancing force against Soviet forces 
stationed in the northern zone.9 Upon arrival, the US Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) 
quickly recognized the need to create and set about implementing an effective 
indigenous South Korean security force. The South Korean constabulary was initially 
established on 14 January, 1946. Nevertheless, the US advisory mission and experience 
prior to World War II, in general, was limited and the AMG mostly conducted a ‘trial-
and-error’ strategy: ‘the defense force was an adaptation to circumstances, a 
spontaneous creation of the US occupation forces to meet an immediate need.’10 No 
clear policy or doctrine on how to develop a ROK security force existed.  
Envisioned as the foundation of a future ROK Army, the KC was initially 
designed to function as an auxiliary force structure to the KNP in dealing with internal 
security issues.11 Moreover, its organization was territorial in nature: ‘one company 
would be formed in each of the eight provinces of South Korea’, and ‘each provincial 
regiment was responsible for recruiting its own constabulary-men.’12 That is, the 
formation and recruitment of constabulary units would be done independently in each 
province.   
Responsibility for training the KC was initially assigned to the USAFIK.13 
However, after the election of Syngman Rhee as the first president of the Republic of 
Korea, the undermanned and underfunded Provincial Military Advisory Group (PMAG) 
was burdened with the task of training government forces.14 As the US prepared to pull-
out completely from the Korean peninsula in 1949, the United States Military Advisory 
Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG) was created in place of PMAG, in order to 
continue with the training of the ROK Army.15 Under the guidance of both PMAG and 
KMAG, the constabulary continued to develop and ended up playing a critical role in 
the peninsula-wide COIN operations that took center stage from 1948 onwards.  
Efforts both to develop and train a separate ROK security force were confronted 
by three interrelated challenges in the early stages. First, officer training capacity 
initially could not keep pace with the actual growth of the constabulary. Such imbalance 
between the growth of actual units and officer corps resulted in the premature 
promotion of inexperienced and, often times, incompetent junior-level officers.16 
Moreover, a lack of knowledge of the Korean culture and language barriers led to the 
recruitment of a large number of officers with dubious loyalties towards the newly 
formed South Korean state or with strong leftist views.17  Without a strict set of criteria 
and requirements for an effective security force, competent and experienced leadership 
at levels was lacking. The officer corps, in particular, was inexperienced, incompetent, 
and politically divided. 
Second, the constabulary was essentially created ‘under fire’ due to continuous 
attacks by insurgent groups. Combined with a lack of equipment this hampered its 
initial operations and growth.18  Finally, the KC was organized and trained to deal with 
internal security issues as an auxiliary force to the KNP, but not under the command of 
the latter. As the constabulary forces grew in both size and prestige and without clearly 
delineated roles under the AMG, rifts between the two security branches would appear 
and become increasingly severe.19 Further fueling this rivalry between the KC and the 
KNP was an ideological divide, as the latter was composed primarily of right-leaning 
personnel. 
In a nutshell, efforts to develop an indigenous South Korean security force, 
particularly one that could deal with internal threats, were mired in complex political 
and social challenges. American advisors mostly lacked a clear-cut policy and doctrine 
and the trial-and-error approach that they had adopted in essence remained inadequate 
in tackling concerns surrounding the composition and effectiveness of the fighting 
force. Consequently, the KC units were mostly inexperienced and politically divided 
and its leadership for the most part incompetent. It is within this context that the 
government forces embarked on COIN missions that would last from more than six 
years.  
Jeju Island uprising: brutality and tactical ineffectiveness 
A mass demonstration on Jeju Island commemorating the 1st March Korean 
independence movement from Japanese colonial rule resulted in skirmishes between 
demonstrators and members of the KNP sent to maintain public order. In the processes, 
government troops opened fire on the demonstrators, killing six. These killings set the 
stage for a year of growing unrest on the island and increasing tensions between the 
islanders, on the one hand, and the KNP, on the other.20 Tensions soon boiled over, 
ultimately leading to the eruption of a full-blown insurgency in early April 1948, when 
insurgents launched a coordinated attack on 12 police stations. While government 
forces eventually managed to defeat the insurgency, their COIN campaign was marked 
a lack of interagency cooperation and co-ordination between the KC and KNP, and 
overall tactical ineptness. In fact, it was because of these three factors, it appears, that 
the insurgency lasted as long as it did.21  
Violent repression to suppress the outbreak of the insurgency was the immediate 
response selected by the central government in April 1948. Making little effort to 
identify and resolve local grievances that were at the root of the insurgency, the nascent 
government of Rhee sent reinforcements to the island with orders to put down the 
rebellion by force.22 In early May 1948, Lt. Col. Jin-kyung Park of the 11th Regiment 
was appointed as commanding officer of the newly installed Jeju Island Constabulary 
Command.23 Lt. Col. Park initiated a three-phase COIN strategy: 1) construction of 
strategic hamlets to separate the population from the insurgents and which were to be 
guarded by local police and militias; 2) sweeping operations around the Halla Mountain 
region by 11th Regiment to identify and destroy insurgent units; and 3) the creation of 
screening centers to identify and eliminate suspected leftists.24 Lt. Col. Park’s regiment 
adopted an aggressive approach to suppress the insurgency. Mass arrests and 
prosecution followed as an estimated 3,000-4,000 were hauled into detention centers.25  
After an initial wave of repression, which seemed to have subdued the 
insurgency, fighting flared up again in August of 1948. This, in turn, led to a renewal 
and escalation of the COIN campaign. After some setbacks, the constabulary forces 
regrouped and regained the momentum by November of that year. In doing so they 
significantly increased the level of repression. The COIN campaign reached a much 
bloodier stage leading to the massacre of thousands of civilians. More than 80 percent 
of the villages situated in the middle of the island were pillaged during this period of 
renewed violence, despite the fact that the insurgent forces never amounted to more 
than roughly 600 combatants at any given moment.26 As John Merrill notes, ‘[t]he 
violence reached its peak in mid-December when 630 persons were killed in a single 
week. The disproportion between guerrilla and constabulary losses, as well as the 
limited number of weapons captured, indicate that the government forces resorted to a 
tremendous amount of overkill.’27 Not only this, government forces also relocated about 
100,000 civilians, while ‘destroying nearly 40,000 homes.’28  
The repression continued throughout 1949. In March of that year, a special 
combat command, led by Col. Chae-hung Yoo, was put in charge of mop-up operations 
on the island and was given specific orders to ‘clean up the estimated 500 remaining 
guerrillas by April [1949].’29 Reinforcements were still being sent from the mainland to 
the island. In addition to the 2nd Regiment and auxiliary units, the special combat 
command was reinforced with a paramilitary force, a ‘separate ranger battalion, railroad 
police detachments, and elements from the South Chungchong Province police’.30  
The special combat command continued the strategy of brutality adopted by its 
predecessors. In its first month, the operation killed a purported 2,345 insurgents and 
1,668 civilians.31 Likewise, in March, the US G-2 periodic report pointed out that “an 
estimated 14,000-15,000 civilians had been killed with at least 80 percent of the 
casualty a result of the government forces.”32 By December 1949 the COIN campaign 
had achieved its desired effects, although at great cost to the civilian population. The 
insurgency was on the wane. A last ditch insurgent offensive was defeated by the 
government forces, again with a great deal of brutality. The KC, moreover, committed 
frequent atrocities against civilians.33 By the time that North Korea invaded the South in 
June 1950, the Jeju Island insurgency was over. In all, by relying on the widespread use 
of brutality and violence, the KC and the KNP had eliminated the insurgents. 
Pacification or civil operations as peaceful solutions to the insurgency, such as 
negotiation with the insurgent leadership and the release of captured non-combatant 
insurgents, were used by the KC during the initial (April-May 1948) and the final staged 
of the operation (March-May 1949), but such efforts were largely overshadowed by 
mass killings and forced relocation.34 
Although the COIN campaign achieved its goal, the campaign also revealed 
significant weaknesses in the operational and tactical capabilities of the ROK security 
forces. In particular, the COIN campaign was characterized by interagency rivalries and 
tactical ineptness that would have made it difficult for the ROK security forces to 
emerge victorious from a conflict against a better organized insurgent movement. First, 
cooperation between the KNP, which spearheaded the Jeju COIN campaign, and the KC 
playing a support role was initially very poor. From their inceptions, the two 
organizations had experienced serious tension, which sometimes caused gang-fights, 
due to ideological differences: while the KNP leaned toward the right, the members of 
KC were relatively leftist in orientation.35 Such interagency rift between the two 
security branches would continue until the formation of the Jeju Island Constabulary 
Command. In one instance, the police would set a whole village situated in the middle 
of the island on fire and claim that it was the conduct of guerrillas merely to coerce 
constabulary participation.36 This was partly due to the fact that they did not share a 
single chain of command. Due to the lack of tactical coordination between the security 
units, even basic screening operations and search missions in and around the cities were 
often difficult to conduct. The constabulary would support the police with cordoning 
duties when necessary. But they would not be involved in any engagements or active 
missions, and the police on its own lacked the necessary manpower to achieve 
successfully their mission.37  
Tensions between the KNP and KC were not only due to organizational issues, 
however. Many of the constabulary troops were islanders who sympathized with the 
insurgents.38 As the later focused their wrath primarily on the KNP and the right-wing 
youth group members, the constabulary was not inclined to get in the middle of the 
conflict. For many within the ranks, ‘the rebellion was really a quarrel between the 
people and police.’39 Such attitudes did not create a great deal of goodwill between the 
KNP and KC forces, as the former believed that the constabulary on the island was 
penetrated and infiltrated by communist elements.  
Such interagency coordination and cooperation issues were noted by US 
advisers and attempts to rectify the situation were attempted throughout the campaign, 
especially in the early going. During the early phase of the uprising, the AMG sent Lt. 
Col. John Mansfield and Captain Clarence DeReus to help with coordination issues of 
the Jeju COIN operations, and in the process set-up the centralized Jeju Island 
Constabulary Command.40 In addition, the US advisors attempted to unify the command 
on the island by initiating an internal screening process to weed out the subversive 
elements within the constabulary ranks. Subsequently, a new Department of Internal 
Security G-2 unit was created.41 Finally, Col. Rothwell Brown of the US 6th Regiment 
stationed in Kwangju was sent as a special adviser to the Jeju Island COIN operations. 
Col. Brown pointed to the near non-existent cooperation between different security 
forces as the main reasons behind the failure to suppress the insurgency at the start.42 
Despite increased coordination of different security units at the tactical level, 
constabulary troops from the Jeju Island continued to be largely excluded from the 
COIN operations. 
A second characteristic of the COIN campaign on Jeju was the tactical ineptness 
of the constabulary forces. Poor leadership and training were among the chief causes. 
Korean officers, moreover, failed to follow the advice from their US counterparts, and 
‘many of the army casualties can be attributed to the failure to follow the tactical 
suggestions of US advisors.’43 Evidence also demonstrates the ineffective employment 
of forces during the campaign as certain KC elements were stationed in the peaceful 
areas at the edge of the island until the very end of operations rather than the 
mountainous area where active insurgency was ongoing. Such deployment of forces, as 
one leader of the KC admitted, more likely led to greater civilian abuses and 
uneconomic use of troops.44 It appears that the KC and KNP did achieve their victory 
only through superior fire-power and repressive means.  
The Jeju Island uprising was not the only internal challenge facing the Rhee 
government in the years immediately prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. In 
October 1948, the violence on Jeju spilled over to the mainland. Although the rebellion 
that broke out around the cities of Yeosu and Soonchun in South Jeolla province had 
local roots, it provided the impetus for the outbreak of region-wide insurgency in the 
south, eventually led by the South Korean Labor Party (SKLP).45  
Yeo-Soon rebellion  
The heightening of armed struggle on Jeju Island was soon followed by the Yeo-Soon 
rebellion. On the evening of 19 October 1948, a battalion of the 14th Regiment, 5th 
Brigade of the ROKA46 stationed just outside of Yeosu was ordered to reinforce the 
units fighting on Jeju Island.47 The regiment was well-armed having been recently 
supplied with American rifles and ammunition stocks.48 The regiment, however, was 
also infiltrated by leftist elements. These bad elements, estimated initially to be about 40 
men, mutinied, killing and imprisoning 20 loyalist officers and rallying roughly 800 to 
their cause.49 Other SKLP sympathizers in the regiment joined the mutiny and the rebel 
force rapidly grew to approximately 2,000-3,000 troops.50  
The rebels immediately engaged in a concentrated attack on KNP forces, rightist 
youth groups, and government sympathizers, as they took over Yeosu. In the process, 
they killed an estimated 500 people.51 The next morning, about a sixth of the insurgent 
force marched to the nearby city of Soonchun where two other companies of the 14th 
Regiment linked up with the insurgent forces.52 By the afternoon of 21 October the 
insurgents were able to take hold of nearby small towns such as Kwangyang and 
Namwon, building a hastily formed defense line.53 Once the insurgents were in power, 
the Soonchun People’s Committee and courts were resurrected, leading to the arrests 
and the mass execution of rightist leaders and youth group members in the area.  
The Rhee administration, in consultation with American military advisers, 
quickly created a Counter-rebel Combat Command located in Kwangju under the 
leadership of then ROKA Commander-in-Chief, Brigadier General Ho-Sung Song.54 
The 4th Regiment from Kwangju was set to move east, elements from the 3rd and 2nd 
Regiment were to coordinate together as they went south from Chungchong Province, 
and units from the 5th and 15th Regiments were deployed both as holding positions to 
block insurgents from escaping towards the mountains. By the evening of 21 October, 
Yeosu was completely encircled and specially designated units for the operation under 
Lt. Col. Kim made their move from the north.55 
The main priority of the newly created command was to retake the two cities, an 
effort that required substantial co-ordination and cooperation between units from eleven 
different brigades and regiments, including ROKA battalions from nearby regions such 
as Pusan, Taegu, and Kunsan.56 Eleven ROKA battalions, KNP combat units and right-
wing youth groups were mobilized for the COIN operation. US assistance consisted of 
the provision of spotter planes and naval patrols to prevent possible North Korean 
and/or Soviet assistance and reinforcements for the insurgents.57 The strategy selected 
was simple. It consisted of a campaign designed to drive the strongest forces south 
starting from Soonchun.58  
The fight to retake Soonchun did not last long as elements of the 4th Regiment 
fought insurgent forces to a standstill around the Hakgu-ri area. Two battalions of the 
12th Regiment pushed through the insurgent lines, manned by around a thousand rebels 
and leftist youth group members. Once the rebels retreated, Maj. In-Yup Paik sent 
mobile units and targeted downtown police stations without delay in the hopes of 
destroying potential rebel strongholds. Although rebel resistance was weak, the ROKA 
forces retreated for reinforcements. The next morning, the ROKA units once more 
charged into Soonchun, with armored vehicles leading the main assaults.59 With the 
rebels in full retreat, however, the ROKA forces quickly turned their attention to 
rounding up potential rebel supporters and leftist leaders, allowing the insurgent forces 
to retreat either to the mountains or back to Yeosu.  
By the evening the ROKA forces had regrouped and refocused, and managed to 
encircle Yeosu and nearby cities. Armored units pushed down from Soonchun while 
two battalions moved towards Polgyo-ri in an attempt to link up with the main units 
from Kwangju.60 The initial efforts to retake Yeosu experienced significant setbacks. 
Units from the 3rd Regiment were hit by an insurgent ambush around Janggoon-bong, 
the main path leading to Yeosu. The ROKA units immediately retreated back and 
waited for reinforcement. On 26 October, the 12th Regiment was sent from Kwangyang 
and once again placed as the main assault unit. By sending elements of this unit to 
Yeosu, the pacification of Kwangyang was not fully accomplished and once again 
allowed a huge number of insurgents to escape to Chiri and Paegun mountains.61 Even 
with the main insurgent forces escaping the city, strong resistance persisted and the 
ROKA had to rely on heavy firepower. Remaining forces put up a well-fortified 
defense, displayed accurate marksmanship and fought as well-organized units which 
often delayed advancing ROKA forces by setting fires all around the city. On 25 
October, ROKA forces relied on mortar fire and indiscriminate firing to pierce their way 
and later that day constabulary engaged in fierce, though limited, battles within the 
city.62 By early evening of the 27 October, the government forces had full control of 
Yeosu. Yet, most of the main insurgent units had already made their way into the Chiri 
mountain regions.63  
Altogether, the initial response to the Yeo-Soon uprising achieved mixed results. 
Although the government forces succeeded in retaking the cities occupied by the 
insurgents, they did not succeed in defeating the majority of the insurgents who had 
escaped to fight another day. More importantly, ROKA forces suffered significant 
setbacks and overall did not perform very well despite their superior technological and 
manpower advantage. Two broad reasons could be found for the shortcomings and for 
the operational mistakes made.  
First, the leadership structure in the Counter-rebel Command had not been 
firmly established until this point. During the initial stage of the COIN operations, there 
were changes in command authorities among top ROKA leaders. Brigadier General 
Song, the Commander-in-Chief of the ROKA, was the senior commander of the COIN 
operations. However, the brigades and regiments under Gen. Song were not actually 
commanded by him. Even though Gen. Song was willing to lead the COIN forces 
himself, he was excluded from the operations by other members of his staff.64 The 
aforementioned Cols. Kim and Paik, the Commander of the 5th Brigade and the chief-
of-staff of the Command respectively, with the guidance of Capt. James Hausman, a 
key figure in the American military advisory mission in South Korea and a military 
advisor to Gen. Song during the rebellion, led the troops. After initial defeat of the 
COIN forces at Soonchun on 20 October, for instance, Gen. Song maintained that the 
siege of the city should be resumed after concentrating troops, but Cols. Kim and Paik 
resumed the attack on the very next day, contrary to the commander’s initial plan.65 
Likewise, Col. Yong-dok Won, the commander of the 2nd Brigade, was excluded from 
the leadership for the COIN operations. These leadership changes reflected the rise of 
the officers who had served in the Manchukuo Imperial Army (MIA), especially those 
who had gained military experience during COIN operations against anti-Japanese 
guerrillas during World War II. Even though the Brigade General Song was appointed 
as the commander-in-chief of the ROKA to emphasize the connection between the 
Korean Liberation Army (KLA) and the ROKA,66  former MIA officers were 
considered better trained and more professional in an actual combat than those who 
served in the KLA. For example, Capt. Hausman was skeptical about the competence of 
former KLA officers, regarding the KLA as ‘a mere accessory of Chiang Kai-Shek.’67 
Additionally, these rising junior officers’ hawkish perspective on communism also 
played a role in their promotion. This reflects the growing anti-communist sentiment 
within ROKA.68 However, the co-ordination problem between the police and army, 
which undermined the effectiveness of the COIN operations in Jeju, was significantly 
resolved during operations during the Yeo-Soon Incident. Under martial law was 
instituted, which became effective August 26, 1948,69 the ROKA maintained the 
strategic initiative, and the KNP took an auxiliary role in support of the ROKA.70  
Moreover, the Rhee government intervened in the campaign and demanded that 
the government forces focus their attention on retaking the cities. Instead of being 
allowed to focus on destroying the enemy, government forces were obligated to 
concentrate their attention on the two cities rather than the rebel forces. The government 
did not offer the military sufficient time to prepare itself for offensive actions. As Alan 
Millett states, ‘retaking a city was far more important than conducting a coordinated and 
careful campaign that would seal the Yeosu peninsula and capture the rebels.’71  
Second, the Korean government forces failed to display a great deal of tactical 
and operational competence, especially in terms of leadership. In fact, American 
advisers who were closely involved in the campaign were dismayed at the low level of 
soldiering exhibited by the Korean forces. Thus, both ‘[Col. Minor] Kelso and [Lt. 
Foster] Cowey were disgusted with the sloppy tactics, poor preparation, lethargy, and 
overall sense of apathy.’72As a result of the two factors, the operation to retake Yeosu-
Soonchun was plagued by cooperation and co-ordination issues among the active units. 
Subsequently, overseeing the mission from headquarters was much more difficult than 
first envisioned by Capt. James Hausman and Lt. Col. Sun-Yup Paik.73 Units such as 
the task force of the 5th Regiment failed to heed instructions by US advisors to 
cooperate with Col. Kim and tried to force their way through the ports of Yeosu, 
resulting in exposure to enemy heavy fire while accruing limited gains.74 Likewise, 
battles that involved the elements of the 4th, 6th, 15th and 12th Regiments were mired in 
similar co-ordination problems.75 The campaigns were the first major combat operations 
undertaken by the ROKA since its creation. They did a great deal to expose the 
interrelated weaknesses of the organization: failures in leadership and poor co-
ordination amongst the various units that ultimately resulted in substandard tactical 
performance.76 Altogether, therefore, the constabulary performed rather poorly.  
The first phase of the COIN operations was immediately followed by the second 
phase: the pursuit of remaining insurgents and the purging of constabulary forces of 
leftists. Led by Col. Paik, the military intelligence agents brought in approximately 
2,000-5,000 officers for trial, out of which more than 500 received death sentences.77 
The purge, according to a KMAG adviser, improved the effectiveness of the ROK 
Army while at the same time settling a serious internal ideological divide: ‘[t]he 
Constabulary took on a new air of professionalism, confidence, and cooperation.’78  
As the constabulary purge was underway, special task force teams led by 
Colonels Won and Il-kwon Chong patrolled the mountain regions searching for 
remaining insurgent forces. General cordon-and-search operations were undertaken to 
search villages for possible guerrilla supporters.79 Gripped in ideological struggles, 
hatred-filled mass killing took over in an anarchical setting during next eight days of 
fighting.80 
Border conflicts and continuing COIN campaigns, 1948-1950  
Immediately following the Yeo-Soon battles, the Chiri Mountain (Chiri-san) COIN 
campaigns followed in pursuit of insurgent forces that escaped from the two cities. Until 
the eve of the Korean War some 19 months later, the South would be embroiled in 
widespread guerrilla activities, thus starting what is widely considered the second phase 
of mainland COIN operations and the initiation of organized guerrilla warfare in the 
southern zone.81 Due to continuing purges of officers and certain constabulary units, 
rebellions and mutinies of smaller scale persisted throughout the peninsula, such as the 
Taegu rebellion. The constabulary forces would go on to conduct more than 500 
counter-guerrilla actions in the second half of 1949 alone.82  
The second COIN (or spring suppression) campaign started in spring 1949 as 
guerrilla activities peaked along with rising border conflicts and North Korean 
infiltration into the South.83 Together with the North Korean agents, constabulary 
rebels, SKLP members and leftist youth initiated guerrilla warfare, particularly in the 
Cholla, Kyongsang and Kangwon provinces, from the Chiri and Taebaek mountain 
ranges. It was during this time that President Rhee ordered Sung-mo Shin, the minister 
of defense, to take personal charge in combating the nationwide insurgency rather than 
being left to individual headquarters in various combat areas.84 Consequently, the Chiri-
san Task Force was created in 1949. With the Task Force taking command of the COIN 
operations both along the border and the Chiri- and Taebek-san area, better results were 
recorded and guerrilla activities visibly declined in the following months. By March 
1950, the insurgency had pretty much died down and ROKA reported that 5,621 
guerrillas were either captured or killed with more than 1,000 weapons seized.85 The 
overall strategy was to form an encircling net (powi-mang) around Chiri Mountain as 
units moved to nearby cities, with the most competent 12th Regiment once again placed 
as the main strike force.86  
The initial stages of the suppression campaign did not produce positive results as 
the insurgent forces (remnants of the rebellious14th Regiment) held the upper hand; 
insurgents targeted weakened units located in nearby towns during the night, avoided 
direct contact whenever possible, and continued with hit-and-run and ambush tactics 
during this period.87 Two interrelated factors can be identified for the initial failures of 
the constabulary forces. First, the topographical setting, weak communications amongst 
units, poor quality of maps, and limited supplies all posed major external challenges and 
constraints for the constabulary.88 That is, insurgents were not only much more mobile 
but were also able to better understand and utilize the external environment. Second, 
government forces initially played a more passive role as they chased the trails left 
behind by rebels with information available to them through locals and villagers in the 
early going.89 
Nevertheless, COIN performance at the operational and tactical level would 
show vast improvements through the winter of 1949 and early 1950. First, from a 
tactical standpoint, the unified command structure allowed the most competent junior-
level officers to be “hand-picked to fill command and staff positions of the three active 
task forces and, for once, the ROKA established an effective intelligence net, as well as 
acquiring adequate transportation and supplies for a sustained winter campaign.”90 The 
selected junior officers displayed tactical adaptability and, as a result, competency, vis-
à-vis the rebel elements. The momentum-shifting battle between Lt. Chi-hoe Kim’s 
insurgent forces and Maj. Paik’s 12th Regiment units in Gurye is an example of such 
initiative and responsiveness displayed by junior-level officers. Completely switching 
from an offensive plan that had failed in the previous few months, Maj. Paik prepared 
his regiment to go on the defensive and waited for the enemy to strike first.91 The battle 
on 5 November was the first major blow for the insurgent forces and resulted in an 
estimated 50 either killed or captured and the remaining elements retreating back to the 
mountains.92 Due to this failure, it is around this time that the insurgents switched from 
battalion-sized offensives to smaller and more dispersed hit-and-run attacks.93 
Moreover, the government forces kept building the momentum by integrating civilian 
measures much more effectively than in previous operations; strict screening procedures 
were implemented, the civilian defense corps began to player a greater role, and 
psychological warfare methods such as dropping leaflets were utilized.94 During this 
operation, the ROKA also maintained much improved relationship with KNP. This 
greatly increased the army's intelligence regarding the whereabouts of the insurgents.95 
Second, advancements in tactical effectiveness of the government forces under 
the guidance of the KMAG are another notable factor. Around mid-1949, Gen. William 
Roberts, the head of the advisory mission, assigned as many advisors as resources 
would permit all the way to the battalion level to improve the combat effectiveness of 
the KC, especially in dealing with the COIN operations.96 By assigning KMAG 
advisors more closely, Gen. Roberts could observe the progress of the constabulary 
forces on the battlefield.97 Moreover, such COIN campaigns proved to be valuable for 
the constabulary/ROKA in terms of on the field combat effectiveness and training.98 
Under such careful US guidance all the way down to the tactical level, improvements 
were noticed as guerrilla activities started to decline.  
Operation RATKILLER 
As the Korean War slowly began reaching a stalemate point, the insurgent forces, 
comprised of remaining guerrilla elements of previous campaigns along with the 
fragments of the North Korean forces and leftist sympathizers, continued to mount 
successful attacks in the rear of the UN forces, effectively forming a second front from 
within. The remnants of North Korean units left in the southern zone, estimated to be 
about a force of 40,000, would fight side-by-side along with the communist 
insurgents.99 The remaining communist insurgents in the Chiri Mountains regained their 
military power under the unified command of Hyun-sang Lee, an experienced guerrilla 
leader dispatched from the North, under the name of Southern Corps (Nambugun).  
During the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s (PVA) Spring Offensive, Lee’s 
Nambugun units bypassed the UN forces and rapidly moved south, occasionally 
attacking UN and ROK troops from behind and capturing their arms and munitions. 
While proceeding to the South, Lee’s units also assaulted a number of police stations 
and even temporarily occupied an entire city of Cheongju. When the PVA’s offensive 
was finally stalled by UN forces, Nambugun decided to link up with the remaining 
insurgents in the Chiri mountain range. Lee claimed a unified command over all the 
remaining communist guerrilla forces in the southern zone and provided unarmed 
insurgents with weapons.100 Under Lee’s leadership, a reorganized guerrilla group of 
approximately 4,000 insurgents launched large-scale attacks on nearby towns and 
villages to collect food, and disturb ROKA’s supply routes to the frontline.101 Even 
railroads that connect Busan and Daegu, principal parts of the main railroad system in 
the ROK, could be operated only during the days.102  
In response, the Korean National Assembly voted overwhelmingly in support of 
military operations to restore law and order within the southern zone. With support from 
Gen. James Van Fleet, the new Commander of the US Eighth Army and UN-led forces, 
Task Force Paik was officially created to conduct Operation RATKILLER.103 The main 
objective of this operation was ‘to neutralize the guerrillas’ longtime Chiri stronghold 
without further delay.’104 The overarching COIN strategy was to concentrate ROK 
forces simultaneously from both the north- and south-side, forming an encirclement 
around the Chiri mountain area. As Gen. Paik recalls, the instructions from Gen. Van 
Fleet were as follows: ‘One division would land at Yosu and then march north. The 
other division would travel overland to Taejon and then march south. The two would 
converge on the Chiri Mountains and attack from all sides at once.’105 The task force 
operated from 30 November 1951 to 15 March 1952. 
Compared to security forces of previous COIN operations, the two divisions 
under the command of Task Force Paik, the Capital and the Eighth Division, were far 
more experienced by this stage. The Capital Division was included in the task force as it 
had demonstrated outstanding performance at the frontline. The Division commander, 
Brigadier General Yo-chan Song had vast experience in COIN operations on Jeju Island 
and Odea Mountain. In addition, the Eighth Division was familiar with the Chiri 
Mountain range from previous COIN operations in the area between April and May 
1951.106 During its earlier COIN operation in the Chiri Mountain area, the division 
successfully targeted the communist insurgents without massive civilian casualties, 
unlike previous COIN operations under the command of Brigadier General Yeong-hui 
Choi.107  
The formation of Task Force Paik is significant from an operational perspective. 
The different security branches united under Gen. Paik’s headquarters avoided some of 
the cooperation and co-ordination issues from previous operations. Also, the COIN 
operation was led by Gen. Paik himself as commanding officer of the new task force. 
Moreover, the leadership of the task force was strongly committed to this COIN 
operation unlike commanders of previous operations. Leadership frequently took a 
reconnaissance plane to survey the enemy formation and to ensure that his units 
operated as planned. During the previous COIN operations, one chronic problem of the 
ROKA was that some low-level units did not follow the outlined operation plan, 
avoided engaging enemies, and made inaccurate after-action reports.108 Such problems 
at the operational level were eliminated by the surveillance efforts made of the junior 
officers. As a result, troops of Task Force Paik took a more aggressive posture. 
According to records taken by the former insurgents in Chiri Mountain, unlike typical 
COIN forces who left the mountain by sunset, soldiers under the command of the task 
force built bunkers and guarded major ridges and hills throughout the operation.109 At 
night, torches were installed in every 100 meters on major ridgelines to block the 
communists from escaping. As one former insurgent described, ‘the whole Chiri 
Mountain looked like a giant Christmas Tree.’110 This dramatically reduced the overall 
mobility of the insurgents.  
Moreover, Task Force Paik headquarter displayed a high-level of tactical 
flexibility as it adapted to the operational needs of the campaign. Its commanders 
assigned missions according to the leadership style of officers and the experience of the 
actual units. For example, the Capital Division led by Gen. Song would take the 
mountainous region towards the east; this assignment was made due to the Division’s 
experience in prior COIN operations as well as Gen. Song’s volatile yet daring 
personality.111 This flexibility did also stretch down to the lower levels. During the 
operation Gen. Paik would relieve his highly regarded G-3, Col. Kuk-chin Kong as he 
failed to show tactical adaptability when the situation required. When Col. Yang-soo 
Yoo, the G-2 of the Task Force, proposed an attack on Mount Tokyu due to latest 
intelligence on the insurgent whereabouts, Col. Kong opposed it pointing out that it was 
a deviation from the original plan. As arguments arose, Gen. Paik would side with Col. 
Yang arguing that it was such flexibility that was a prerequisite to successful COIN 
operations.112 As this example indicates, unlike massive cordon-and-search operations 
apparent in previous COIN operations, a greater number and precision in intelligence 
reports and higher level of junior-level officer initiative were one of the key 
determinants in the successful implementation of Operation RATKILLER.  
Such improvements were largely made possible by the unification of the 
command structure of the government forces. A more centralized, and as a result more 
cohesive, command also paved the way for the implementation of political and social 
programs alongside the military mission.113 Psychological operations, such as the 
dropping of leaflets, could now be implemented as part of the COIN strategy. 
Subsequently, compared to earlier COIN campaigns civilian abuses, by no means 
eliminated, dropped dramatically.114 
After operation RATKILLER, the insurgent attacks, both in terms of quantity and 
intensity, never threatened the internal order in the South before slowly dying down 
towards the end of the Korean War. With Task Force Paik leading the COIN operations, 
an estimated 5,009 insurgents were killed and 4,013 either were captured or 
surrendered.115 According to estimates from the former insurgents, approximately 1,200 
insurgents survived the operations.116 Fundamentally, the task force displayed a higher 
level of combat effectiveness due to better co-ordination at the tactical level as well as 
higher level of junior-level officer initiative led to flexible responses at times of need.  
Conclusion: lessons learned  
As the accounts of the four cases within the South Korean COIN campaign suggests 
there were significant differences in the effectiveness of the KC/ROKA units involved 
in these operations. While the KC managed to put down the first two uprisings, it was 
by no means completely successful, as guerrilla warfare spread to other regions of 
South Korea after the operations. Furthermore, a closer examination of the performance 
of the security units shows that it was the weakness of the insurgents, rather than the 
tactical proficiency of the government troops, which was a determining factor in the 
ROKA’s military success. By contrast, the Chiri Mountain campaign and Operation 
RATKILLER showed a much more proficient ROKA. Not only did the commanders of 
the operation ensure that the troops under their command would limit civilian abuses, 
they also showed much greater degrees of operational and tactical proficiency. 
An assessment of the campaigns suggests that improvements in performance can 
be attributed to four major factors. First, the unity of command between the different 
security forces serves as a critical element for combat effectiveness. Having a branch as 
the designated lead in the overall operation through an integrated chain of command 
allowed the government forces to overcome many of the initial problems that it had 
initially encountered.117 The KNP and the KC/ROKA were organizational rivals from 
the beginning, a rivalry that sometimes even led to actual bloodshed between members 
of the two organizations. According to the national police, the constabulary was a 
collection of misfits and left-leaning subversives. The fact that constabulary soldiers 
were directly involved in starting the Yeo-Soon uprising strengthened their case. In 
operational terms, however, it is clear that the rivalry between the two and the absence 
of a clear organizational structure significantly hampered the COIN operations on Jeju 
Island and the Yeo-Soon campaigns. This problem had been remedied by the time of 
Operation RATKILLER, where the military commander was clearly in charge and the 
police was subordinated to him.  
In addition, the restriction of civilian or political interference often led to the 
higher performance level of the fighting forces. While the first two campaigns were 
characterized by a great deal of civilian interference in operational matters, this seemed 
much less the case during the COIN campaign of the late fall of 1951. According to 
some, the constant pressure from Seoul to retake Yeo-Soon, for instance, contributed 
significantly to the constabulary’s failure to plan their attacks on Yeo-Soon and other 
rebel strongholds in sufficient detail. In the end, the focus on retaking Yeo-Soon from 
the rebels, moreover, also allowed a significant number of them to take refuge in the 
mountains. In this context, it is also important to note, that the units that performed best 
during the Jeju and Yeo-Soon campaigns were those in which American field advisers 
had the greatest amount of influence.118 Furthermore, without the political interference 
of earlier operations Task Force Paik could focus on striking the enemy rather than 
protecting territory during Operation RATKILLER.119 Operations did not have to go 
through unnecessary shifts in policies. 
Second, another striking difference between the constabulary of 1948/49 and the 
ROKA of the fall of 1951 was in the general loyalty of the personnel. When the US 
advisory mission in Korea started to build the KC, it was largely unaware of the 
significant ideological and regional cleavages that divided the Korean population in the 
southern zone. As a result, they recruited widely but without the due selection process 
required.120 This proved disastrous, as many of the members of the constabulary turned 
out to be less than motivated to fight insurgents given their own opposition to the South 
Korean government. After the Jeju and Yeo-Soon campaigns, the constabulary was 
purged of so-called subversive elements. Furthermore, majority of the officers chosen 
for the later operations were largely selected on merit and COIN experience rather than 
political or personal ties. The Task Force Command also made sure each commanding 
officer was given assignments based on not just experience but also individual 
temperament. Consequently, the marked improvement in leadership qualities was 
another key factor that led to vast improvement in combat effectiveness of the South 
Korean security forces.  
Third, with better coordination and cooperation of the security forces, tactical 
level mobility was a key characteristic of Operation RATKILLER. A self-assessment of 
the overall operations pinpoints this aspect as one of the key tactical concepts: ‘(4) 
Execution must be rapid. Strong mobile forces operating under rigid control must be 
utilized. They must be backed up by adequate blocking forces disposed in depth to 
prevent the escape of small units from dispersed groups.’121 The operation focused on 
striking the enemy with full force in a rapid maneuver of encirclement. Through strict 
co-ordination, the national police, subordinate to the Task Force Headquarters, would 
then be responsible of the mop-up operations.  
Finally, it seems that structural changes at KMAG also played an important role 
in improving the operational capabilities of the ROKA units. In the spring of 1951, Gen. 
Van Fleet recognized the need significantly to increase the size of the advisory mission 
and to focus its mission on training. Subsequently, the size of the advisory element 
increased by approximately thirty percent. An integral component for training troops in 
the Korean case was what was known as the ‘counterpart system’. In order to institute 
and implement the necessary missions in developing an indigenous force, ‘the advisory 
group assigned an American officer to each key position in the Korean national defense 
establishment, from the Minister of National Defense down to battalion level.’122 On the 
insistence of Gen. Roberts and through the counterpart system, US advisors and their 
Korean counterparts shared ‘the same office, inspected troops together, attended social 
functions together, and otherwise shared intimately all daily tasks and problems.’123 As 
Walter Hermes points out that the counterpart system was not merely a symbolic 
gesture nor conducted superficially. On the contrary, the counterpart system was 
implemented deep down the chain of command all the way to the battalion-level.124  
In other words, implemented the right way, the counterpart system can certainly 
attain the intended outcome when developing an indigenous security force. Not only did 
the system successfully amalgamate US officers and Korean troops, but such a system 
also allowed American officers to train Korean troops that ensured a certain level of 
combat effectiveness.125 With the start of the Korean War, the system would evolve into 
what is now known as the Korean Augmentation to US Army (KATUSA). Such 
innovative means of training contributed to the level of effectiveness of the Korean 
troops during the later stages of the overall COIN campaigns. In all, together these 
factors appear to have helped significantly in improving the combat effectiveness of the 
ROKA, especially as it pertained to small-unit infantry operations.  
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